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I. INTRODUCTION
As the world of technology explodes with new communication media and
vehicles for interpersonal exchange, concerns over privacy, or lack thereof,
continue to grow, as evidenced by the attention paid the subject in the scholarly
journals.' Some articles proselytize, proposing changes to embrace an author's
concepts of what the relevant statutes should say.2 Others take a more prag-
matic position, analyzing issues and concerns from both user and system
perspectives.3
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I See e.g., Antonia M. Apps & Thomas M. Dailey, Non-Regulation of Advanced Internet
Services, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 681 (2000); John Bentivoglio et al., Global Privacy Law
Update, 20 NO. 6 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 1 (2003); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place
and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L.REv. 439 (2003); Darla W. Jackson,
Protection of Privacy in the Search and Seizure of E-Mail: Is the United States Doomed to
an Orwellian Future?, 17 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 97 (1999); Orin S. Kerr, The Problem
of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357 (2003); Richard A. Mann & Barry S.
Roberts, Cyberlaw: A Brave New World, 106 DICK. L. REV. 305 (2001); Frank C. Morris,
Jr., The Electronic Platform: Email and Other Privacy Issues in the Workplace, 20 NO. 8
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 1 (2003); Donald H. Nichols, Window Peeping in the Work-
place: A Look Into Employee Privacy in a Technological Era, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv.
1587 (2001).
2 See e.g., Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail Monitor-
ing in the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345 (1995); See also, e.g., Julia
Turner Baunhart, The Employer's Right to Read Employee E-mail: Protecting Property or
Personal Prying?, 8 LAB. LAW. 923 (1992); Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch Your E-mail!
Employee E-mail Monitoring and Privacy Law in the Age of the "Electronic Sweatshop," 28
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139 (1994).
3 See e.g., Hall Adams, III et al., E-mail Monitoring in the Workplace: The Good, The Bad
and The Ugly, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 32 (2000); Thomas R. Greenberg, E-mail and Voice Mail:
Employee Privacy and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 219 (1994); Jay P.
Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles Examination of Electronic
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As electronic communication technologies have evolved, published arti-
cles have shifted focus from wiretapping phone lines, to capturing pager
messages, to monitoring of electronic mail ("E-mail"), and now to the realm of
Instant Messaging, or simply "IM," particularly within the workplace.4 '5
IM injects new issues into the analysis. Claimants have alleged violations
of Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),
which, among other things, prohibits interception of "electronic communica-
tions. ' 6 However, courts have held this portion of the ECPA inapplicable to E-
mail monitoring as the data access in question was not contemporaneous with
its transmission.7
An E-mail system logically collects, sorts, and distributes messages
("store and forward"). Sending a message routes and adds that message to a
specialized electronic database. Subsequent message delivery retrieves the data
from database storage, and thereby falls, not under wiretap statutes, 8 but under
the less restrictive statutes governing stored communications data,9 where con-
tents of an employer-provided system may be considered to be the employer's
"property."1 °
This logic potentially fails in the arena of IM. Unlike the store and for-
ward staging of E-mail delivery, IM works more like a direct phone connection,
with messages sent immediately and commonly never stored.11 The specific
Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289 (2002); Douglas M. Topolski & Albert W.
Palewicz, Employee Privacy Rights in the Electronic Workplace, 35-FEB MD. B.J. 40
(2002).
4 Apps & Dailey, supra note 1, at 709-10.
5 Within the realm of privacy in the electronic age, articles may focus on a number of
particular issues, frequently in protection of personal information in user databases, and the
privacy concerns of identity theft and individual profiling. Writers such as Fred Cate have
written extensively in this area, see generally Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy
Protection in the European Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173 (1999); Fred
H. Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 1 (1995), but only peripherally addressing privacy of communications as a
separate and distinct topic. Cate's very definition of privacy as "the claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent informa-
tion about them is communicated to others" (FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE, 22 (1997) (citing ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967)) indicates that his
emphasis is on exposure of personal data, not personal communications. However, even
though such broader-based articles may not be exactly on point, their positions may nonethe-
less be relevant and are cited herein.
6 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(a) (2000).
7 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1994); see
also, Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1237 (D. Nev 1996); Konop v. Hawaiian
Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 2002).
8 Title I of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
9 Title II of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. §§2701-2711 (2000).
'o When a Los Angeles Superior Court judge dismissed the suit brought by Alana Shoars
alleging violations of privacy in her employer's reading of employees' E-mail, the judge's
spokesperson commented that "[i]n essence, the judge said companies have the right to man-
age their E-mail system." Jim Nash & Marua J. Harrington, Who Can Open E-mail; Nissan
Latest to be Sued for Privacy Invasion, COMPUTERWORLD, January 14, 1991 at 1.
" Apps & Dailey, supra note 1, at 709. There may be some question of whether or not a
message appearing on a computer screen, or retained fleetingly in computer RAM (random
access memory) suffices as a storage. The Ninth Circuit, in MAI System Corporation. v.
Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-29 (9th Cir. 1993), held that a copy loaded into
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architecture of the messaging system, particularly whether a message is stored
and how its contents may be disclosed, determines the standard to be applied.
As a further "wrinkle", while employers often provide E-mail services to
their employees, and rely on it as a critical business tool, they less commonly
provide IM. Instead, individual employees often install IM themselves, albeit
on PCs provided by their employer.' 2 Absent a clear and enforced corporate
policy on installation of "personal software" on company computers, the
employer may have no ability to examine IM traffic by any means other than
interception. 13
This Note evaluates the state of the law regarding privacy of IM, both as
to traffic and content. 4 IM is new, even within the mercurial world of elec-
tronic communications, conceptually falling between the postal service nature
of E-mail (collect the mail, sort the mail, distribute the mail) and the conversa-
tional characterization of a phone call. Thus, understanding or interpreting the
law applicable to IM necessitates extracting and analogizing from other, simi-
lar, fields, drawing on cases involving privacy of E-mail, chat rooms, web sites,
pagers and the like.
Part II provides a historic perspective and identifies the conflict between
the privacy interest of the individual, and the business needs of the employer.
Part III looks at the statutes and judicial history relevant to privacy of electronic
communication and attempts to synthesize the law being applied for the various
electronic media, particularly IM. Part IV uses the similarities and differences
of IM and E-mail to develop a heuristic approach to analyze employer acces-
sing of Instant Messages. Part V recommends procedures to protect against
claims of violation of privacy, as well as of inappropriate behavior and failure
to cure. Finally, Part VI recaps and looks at possible future issues and
directions.
RAM could constitute enough of a fixation to be considered a copyright violation, which by
extension, could be enough to distinguish such access from an interception.
12 U.S. v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing U.S. v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103,
1108 (9th Cir. 2000)) to assert "a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in an item in which he has no possessory or ownership interest." If an employee has no
possessory interest in the PC provided by the employer, that employee therefore would not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.).
13 While application storing of messages requires some facility in the IM application itself,
there are software packages commercially available which will allow an employer to simply
access all messages sent or received, or images of all screen displays. Such access may
result in logging of screens (i.e. maintaining a recorded, serial record of screen images), or
even in direct visual monitoring of employee computers. Products such as pcAnywhere®
from Symantec Software, LapLink® from Traveling Software or WideScope® from RazLee
Products, Ltd. are marketed as help desk or software demonstration tools, but provide the
ability to audit any user screen attached to the system, potentially without alerting the moni-
tored user.
14 In some cases, an employer may simply want to know if employees are using IM, and if
so to whom they are communicating. In others, the actual content of the messages may be
the issue.
Fall 2004]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
II. HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION
A. Historical Contex
In 1890, Warren and Brandeis published what many consider to be the
seminal work on rights of privacy. 15 Even after more than a century, this work
remains a springboard for analyses of privacy rights. 16 Asserting that "com-
mon law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what
extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to
others,"17 Warren and Brandeis posit that this includes the right to "fix the
limits of the publicity" of such personal communications regardless of the
method of expression.'s Such right survives until surrendered by the author by
publication to the public.19 In 1890, Warren and Brandeis feared the threat to
personal privacy posed by the advances of technology, to wit the ability to take
photographs surreptitiously, without need for a sitting, and without permission
of the subject.2 ° Today, these concerns have been replaced by concerns regard-
ing the ability of an employer to "electronically eavesdrop" or "censor" the
communications of the employee.
Herbert Spencer Hadley rebutted the Warren and Brandeis position
regarding privacy rights of the individual in 1894,21 asserting
[T]he arguments in favor of [a right of privacy] are based on a misunderstanding of
the authorities cited in support; that the jurisdiction of courts of equity does not on
principle recognize the right to privacy; . . . that equity has no concern with the
feelings of the individual ... except as the inconvenience or injury that a person may
suffer is connected with the enjoyment or possession of property. 22
Hadley's objection is technical and jurisdictional, as the principles of
equity must be "defined and invariable"23 and could not be amended, regard-
less of the personal wishes of the court.24 Hadley asserts that the cases on
which Warren and Brandeis rely 25 were decided on grounds of contract and
property rights26 and that anything further stated in the opinions was simply
dicta. 27 Establishment of a right of privacy "can only be furnished by statutory
legislation."
28
15 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890).
16 Scanning Westlaw's TP-ALL database for references to this article [(Warren +5 Bran-
deis) /p privacy] shows over 170 references between 2000 and 2003.
17 Id. at 198 (citing Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2379 (1769) (Yates, J.).
18 Id. at 198-199.
19 Id. at 199-200.
20 Id. at 211.
21 Herbert Spencer Hadley, The Right to Privacy, 3 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1894).
22 Id. at 4.
23 Id. at 6.
24 Id. at 6-7.
25 Inter alia, Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 MacN. & G. 25 (1849); Pollard v. Photograph Co.,
40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888).
26 HADLEY, supra note 21, at 8-13.
27 Id. at 2.
28 Id. at 20.
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Not surprisingly, early cases disagreed on whether rights of privacy
existed.2 9 However, in the last century, federal and state legislatures have
enacted a framework for general and specific privacy rights, 30 and today courts
look to these foundations, as well as judicial precedent, to decide issues of
privacy. This Note addresses privacy in a specific environment, and in a partic-
ular medium. It is to that situation that attention must be paid, starting with an
understanding of the conflict itself.
Electronic messaging, or E-mail, began pervading the workplace before
the explosion of the Internet. Initially, E-mail systems addressed specific busi-
ness requirements, without regard for individual privacy issues. One such sys-
tem was developed in 1976-77 for P&C Foods in Syracuse, New York.3 This
system provided both the store-and-forward capability seen today in standard
E-mail systems, and the conversational communication facility of IM. Func-
tions were not called E-mail or IM, but were referred to as "queued" and "quick
send." The system was designed around the physical or geographic location of
a recipient, the specific terminal and terminal model being used, and even
included a facility to monitor either quick-send or queued message traffic,
including message content.32 This prototype system routed product orders as
part of a complete business system, and privacy issues did not arise. Managers
monitored message traffic as part of their job function.
Until the mid-1980s designs for E-mail systems varied, but the mainframe/
database orientation remained standard.33 System personnel had access to
messages, in either encrypted or unencrypted form, on the corporate host. User
29 See generally Roberson v. The Rochester Folding Box Co, 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442
(1902) (holding that as the right of privacy was not enforceable by injunction, the court was
unable to stop the unauthorized use of plaintiff's likeness in defendant's advertising). Cf
generally Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 191, 50 S.E. 68 (1904) (granting
plaintiff the right to withdraw from the public view and enjoining defendant from intruding
thereupon by using plaintiff's likeness in defendant's advertising).
30 See infra Part III. A.
31 This system was developed specifically to the specifications provided by the targeted
users, but later became generalized and marketed as Messenger by On-Line Software Inter-
national, Inc. It included both a queued messaging facility which stored messages on a
database for retrieval by receiving user and a "quick-send" function which sent directly to a
user, if that user was signed on to the system, but contained no ability to save a quick-send
message for later delivery, or re-delivery. The author of this Note can attest to the specifica-
tions of this software, as he was also the author of the prototype product.
32 The designers requested a "pose" facility, allowing the system administrator to have ter-
minal A "pose" as terminal B and receive a copy of all terminal B message traffic. Care was
taken to inform users that this function was included in the system, and that therefore their
messages were not to be considered confidential. Again, the software product, and this Note,
have the same author.
33 Commercially marketed products competing with Messenger, such as (what is today)
Interpost offered by Fischer International Systems Corp., employed functionally similar
designs, although omitting the "quick-send" function. The earlier version was unique in that
it ran on more than just IBM mainframes and UNIX servers. The database and supervisory
facilities, however, remained. The author of this Note became privy to the internal design
when offered the job of managing the development of this product for Fischer. Even non-
mainframe products such as Orion, developed in the mid-80's and marketed by Orion Net-
work Solutions, Ltd. of Ilkley, England, has a similar design. The author has marketed and
supported this product for the North American midrange market since 1995.
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privacy concerns did not emerge until years later when complaints over man-
agement audit and review of messages and message traffic first arose.34
Initial claims of privacy violations were made on ethical grounds. Alana
Shoars, plaintiff in the first claim of violation of E-mail privacy, 35 said in
bringing her case against Epson America: 'You don't read other people's mail,
just like you don't listen to their phone conversations." 36 Interestingly, Ms.
Shoars's claims fell largely on deaf ears in the data processing world. The CIO
of Bank of Boston Corporation quipped that a discussion of ethics among Infor-
mation Systems ("IS") professionals "would be a very short meeting. '37 Bank
of Boston found one employee using the corporate computer to handicap horse
races and another running a side business, and terminated them without worry
or concern for any invasion of privacy in identifying such abuses.38 In 1990,
the director of the Electronic Mail Association asserted that the majority of
U.S. corporations agreed with Epson that privacy rights take a back seat to the
needs of the body corporate.3 9
B. Employer Justification
While one may question the morality of monitoring personal communica-
tions, it is difficult to ignore the corporate justification. First, the employer
provides the system on which E-mail is processed, and has the right to maintain
its own system. Such a right includes the right to monitor activity. So held the
California Appellate Court in Shoars v. Epson America, Inc.,4 which holding
has been used as a defense against subsequent claims.
Second, a 1998 survey reported that forty-five percent (45%) of the
employees surveyed reported they had engaged in unethical actions related to
technologies such as E-mail, of which 60% (27% of the total) admitted they
had committed a "highly unethical or illegal act."'" A 1999 survey by the
American Management Association concluded that sixty-seven percent (67%)
of U.S. companies conduct some form of electronic monitoring.42 Remedial
and punitive action often results when abuses are detected4 3 and, while one
34 See infra cases cited in Part III. B.
35 Shoars v. Epson America, Inc., No. B073243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No.
S040065, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 3670 (Cal. 1994). Claim was brought for wrongful termination
after Ms. Shoars was fired for questioning the alleged corporate monitoring of employee
messages.
36 Glenn Rifkin, The Ethics Gap; Despite Growing Attention, Many IS Managers Say It's
Not My Job, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 14, 1991, at 83.
37 Id.
38 Id.
31 Jim Nash, E-mail Spurs New Privacy Debate, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 15, 1990, at 78.
40 Shoars v. Epson America, Inc., No. B073243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No.
S040065, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 3670 (Cal. 1994).
41 See DAVID M. SAFON, ESQ. & WORKLAW NETWORK, WORKPLACE PRIVACY: REAL
ANSWERS AND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS 93 (2000) (Neither unethical nor illegal is defined
therein).
42 See id.
43 See id. (Abuses include diversion of corporate resources for personal uses, sexual harass-
ment, and transmission of unapproved material, be it pornography of corporate secrets).
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might liken such action to bailing the ocean with a teaspoon, if there is enough
publicity for the detected offenders, the deterrent effect may justify the effort.'
Third, an employer sued for harassment may assert an affirmative defense
if that employer has taken all reasonable measures to avoid or correct a prob-
lem.4 5 This assertion requires diligence in policing the workplace, including
the communications to which employees may be subjected. If an employer
could reasonably have known of a problem, and failed to take action, a
harassed, -IS lrilated against, or simply disgruntled employee could bring an
action for failure to implement a reasonable level of detection and control.
4 6
C. Employee Considerations
Of course, there is another side to the issue, namely the negative effects of
monitoring. Three concerns must be addressed, each weighing against such
activity.
First is the ethical question of electronic monitoring per se. Ms. Shoars
contended that "right is right, and wrong is wrong. There is no in-between."47
She found support from Mike Godwin, legal counsel for the Electronic Frontier
Federation, who opined "that monitoring E-mail or searching through elec-
tronic files is flat-out wrong. 'It's inconceivable to think of a circumstance
where you should look at anybody else's electronic mail."' 4 8 While some
companies place corporate concerns above those of the employee,49 other firms
agree with Shoars. "If it's not addressed to you, it's not yours."5 °
Second, pragmatic employers must consider the morale effect of monitor-
ing (particularly of E-mail/IM). While some commentators simply rant about
sweatshop methods, 5' others look at (a) the need to allow some non-business
use of employer-provided messaging systems, and (b) the negative effects of
treating non-business use as "criminal" behavior.52 Employers must also
weigh the effects of the very act of monitoring, the implication that the
employee needs to be "babysat," and the resultant blow to the self-esteem of
the workforce on which an employer's productivity may be based.5 3 Whether
monitoring is used or abused, the employee response is often a feeling of non-
trust, and such policies thereby risk the workforce behaving to justify such non-
trust. A work environment which labors under such tension may attract a lesser
caliber of employee, an employee who works solely to collect a paycheck.54
" To analogize: the IRS audits less than 2% of individual tax returns. Given this minimal
probability of a personal audit, there is no substantial likelihood that an instance of tax abuse
will be detected, yet a deterrent effect posed by the fear of the audit is created.
15 See generally, SAFON, supra note 41, at 93-94.
46 Id.
41 Rifkin, supra note 36.
48 Id.
49 See id.
50 Nash, supra note 39.
51 See Gantt, supra note 2, at 345.
52 See Kesan, supra note 3, at 315-17.
53 See id. at 319-21.
14 Rifkin, supra note 36 (quoting Mike Godwin, general counsel for the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, "If I worked in a place where they reserved the right to look at my E-mail, I'd
be less happy.").
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Third, monitoring of E-mail is a "two-edged sword." On the one hand,
"[e]lectronic documents are no less subject to disclosure than paper docu-
ments."5 5 Failure to monitor may deprive an employer of a "reasonable
efforts" defense to a claim of workplace harassment. On the other hand, moni-
toring, and not acting, may leave the employer in worse shape, having received
(at least) constructive notice of a problem, but having failed to take corrective
steps.
D. Balancing of Interests
There is a clear tension between the needs of the employer and those of
the employee. There is also a dearth of precedent specific to IM. One must
look elsewhere to analogous cases in the E-mail and telephony arenas, and then
synthesize the rules for IM. It is important to do so with all due speed as the
uncertainty of the law gives direction to neither the employer nor the employee,
so the one lacks guidance as to what protection measures are legally permissi-
ble, and the other may never be confident of the privacy of her communica-
tions. The parameters of the arena need to be defined.
Clarifying the laws relating to privacy of IM serves the twin legal goals of
certainty and equity. Unclarity leaves employers in a quandary over whether
monitoring of employee communications is permissible while employees
remain uncertain as to whether their employer is taking unfair advantage. At
the same time, when laws permit multiple interpretations, such laws encourage
inconsistent enforcement, which in turn equates to inequity. Clarification
allows employers to plan, employees to react, and courts to behave predictably.
III. LEGAL RESPONSES
A. Electronic Privacy Statutes
Both Federal and state legislatures have enacted privacy statutes. In addi-
tion, claims may be brought under the common law right to privacy. A review
of such statutes, and a comparison with equivalent statutes found in other coun-
tries, helps put into perspective the state of the law today. Many states modeled
their statutes on federal law, and so it is instructive to commence at the federal
level, and then move to the additions and changes effected by the individual
states.
1. Federal Statutes
Any review of Federal electronic privacy statutes must perforce com-
mence with The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). 56 Addition-
ally, claims have been brought under the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore,
while not statutory, the CONTU report57 provides analysis useful in analyzing
both statutes and cases.
55 Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). See also Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1995 WL 649934, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
("[tihus, today it is black letter law that computerized data is discoverable if relevant.").
56 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
57 See infra note 90.
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a. ECPA
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act protects against unwarranted
interception or retrieval of electronic communications. Title I governs inter-
ception of communications in transmission, such as wiretaps and "bugs."58
Title II protects data post-transmission, typically once a message has been
received and stored.59 Originally enacted in 1968 as part of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the 1986 amendment specifically
incorporated electronic communications, ensuring applicability to E-mail as
well as telephonic communications. 60 This applies equally to both traditional
E-mail and IM, as either transmission qualifies as "transfer of [information]
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric
or photooptical system ... ,,6 1 Also, as storage performed as part of either an
E-mail or an IM function would be a "temporary, intermediate storage of a wire
or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission
thereof, '62 Title II applies as well.
i. Title I - The Wiretap Act
6 3
Section 2511 of the ECPA makes it a criminal offense to "intentionally
intercept[ ], endeavor[ ] to intercept, or procure[ ] any other person to intercept
or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral or electronic communication."6 The
code defines intercept in the prior section,65 omitting clarification of whether
interception must be made during transmission, or if subsequent retrieval from
file storage is also protected. This distinction is important as Title I has more
stringent exceptions than does Title IH.66 Specifically, Title I exempts (a)
switchboard operators in the course of providing service, 67 (b) service provid-
ers, given judicial or executive authorization,68 (c) law enforcement,69 (d) par-
ties to the communication or with the consent of one or more parties,70 or (e)
where communications may be accessible to the general public.71 To put
"teeth" into this protection, the code authorizes and enumerates fines and
imprisonment for offenders.72
While this appears to protect against unauthorized access of E-mail, courts
have held that interception requires data be captured in transmission, "in flight"
58 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
59 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000).
60 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860 (1986).
61 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
62 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).
63 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
64 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (emphasis added).
65 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
66 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000).
67 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
68 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii).
69 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(b)-(c), (e)-(f).
70 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (limited to exclude interception for the purpose of criminal or
tortious acts).
71 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g).
72 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4).
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as it were. 13 Before message transmission or after message receipt, where the
data is held in electronic files, courts have held data access, rather than message
interception, to be the issue, in which case the Stored Communications Act
controls.75
ii. Title II - The Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and
Transactional Records Act 7 6
The Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional
Records Act ("the Stored Communications Act") makes it illegal to "intention-
ally access[ ] without authorization a facility through which an electronic com-
munication service is provided; ... and thereby obtain[ ] ... access to a wire or
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage .... . As the
majority of the E-mail cases 78 involved retrieval of communications after trans-
mission and receipt, this becomes the most applicable statute. Penalties pro-
vided by the Stored Communications Act are roughly parallel to those of the
Wiretap Act.79 However, the statute's very wording provides additional excep-
tions. Allowing "authorized" access, rather than requiring that "one of the par-
ties has given prior consent," permits of a wide range of interpretation, 80 and
courts have found implied authorization in many cases, in particular wherever
the environment provides no "reasonable expectation of privacy." 8'
Indeed, from Shoars v. Epson America, Inc.82 on, courts have consistently
held that E-mail, retained on an employer's computer system, creates no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.83 Even where an employer assured employees
that messages would be considered to be private, presumptions of privacy were
lost once messages were sent and received. 84 Password protection and labeling
files as "personal" does not suffice to trigger the requisite level of expecta-
tion.85 For E-mail, the protection of the Stored Communications Act has been
diluted by the low standard imposed by the courts in recognizing implied
authorization, and the absence of any requirement for an affirmative act to
grant permission.86 How IM fares is less clear, and is discussed in greaterdetail in subsequent parts of this Note.
71 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 460-62 (5th Cir.
1994) (endorsing United States v. Turk, 526 F. 2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 823
(1976)).
74 See infra cases recapped in Part III. B.
71 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711.
76 Id.
77 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
78 See infra cases recapped in Part III. B.
79 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b) (2000).
80 Compare § 2701(a)(1) with § 2511(2)(d).
8' See infra cases recapped in Part I. B.
82 Shoars v. Epson America, Inc., No. B073243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No.
S040065, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 3670 (Cal. 1994).
83 See infra cases recapped in Part III. B.
84 See Smyth v. Pillsbury Company, 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
85 See McLaren v. Microsoft, No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015 (Tex. App. May 28,
1999).
86 See infra cases recapped in Part III. B.
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b. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ."" While the state action
requirement prohibits claims against private actors, public actors have invoked
its protection, above and beyond that provided by the ECPA.88 However, such
claimslll Have 1taaled as corsfudnp-s-bee-ca-n fninvnt
that such invasions of privacy did not rise to a level warranting protection
under the Constitution. 89
c. CONTU Report9 °
The 1978 report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses
of Copyrighted Work (CONTU) addresses one fact of the distinction between
interception and access in IM environments, where messages are not stored on
computer disk files. Related to copyright's fixation requirement, CONTU con-
cludes that loading software into a computer qualifies as the making of a copy.
While no distinction is made between copying into random-access-memory
(RAM) and copying to retrievable disk, or even into read-only-memory
(ROM), courts have held the copy in RAM to constitute a copy, at least for the
fixation requirement. 9 ' It is not unreasonable to then assert that RAM, or
potentially even the PC terminal buffer, constitutes an electronic storage device
from which an electronic message may be accessed, further weakening 18
U.S.C. § 2510. This is discussed in greater detail in Section IV, infra.
2. State Statutes
Over thirty states have enacted statutes limiting interception or retrieval of
electronic communications, generally based on the ECPA, and providing little
additional protection.9 2 A few such statutes warrant individual mention,
addressing the tension between the needs of the employer and those of the
employee at the state level. 93
87 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
88 U.S. v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (1996); U.S. v. Simons, 29 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D. Va.
1998).
89 Id.
90 Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (hereinafter "CONTU") (1978).
91 MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (using the
definition of "fixed" in 17 U.S.C. § 101 where "[a] work is fixed ... when its embodiment
... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for more than transitory duration," the court held that the ability to access,
and process, data so held was sufficiently non-transitory.).
92 Adams, supra note 3, at 40-41.
91 Many states, like the federal government, have considered or enacted laws governing the
protection of confidential electronic information, information such as name or social security
number. Some use nomenclature which makes them appear applicable to this Note, but in
fact they cover different ground, and therefore are not discussed.
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a. Nevada
Nevada legislated "Interception and Disclosure of Wire and Radio Com-
munications or Private Conversations" through Chapter 200 of Title 15. This
statute parallels the Wiretap Act,9 5 and is likewise restricted to interception of
actual transmission. The statutes, however, lacks an analog to the Communica-
tions Storage Act, and so provides less protection.
Bohach v. City of Reno9 6 illustrates the privacy exposure. The court found
no reasonable expectation of privacy for policing officers using a city-provided
computerized paging system.97 The Police Department retrieved information
from the electronic files of the paging service provider, which act did not con-
stitute an interception.98 Further, absent any reasonable expectation of privacy,
the found that an authorization to view these files could be implied. 99 In dicta,
the court commented that the lack of privacy expectation could constitute an
implied prior consent, not simply an implied authorization." This would
seem to eviscerate even the limited protection of The Federal Wiretap Act.
b. Maryland
The Maryland statute on Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance 10 '
closely parallels the Wiretap Act. Like the federal statute, the state statute pro-
tects electronic communications with wording akin to the ECPA's 1986 amend-
ment.102 The state statute however, provides no protection of communications
post-transmission, i.e. once placed in electronic storage. °3 As is the case in
Nevada, the Maryland state statute provides less employee protection than the
federal statute."°
c. Connecticut
Atypical of state enactments, Connecticut's general statutes require notifi-
cation of any monitoring."0 5 The "Protection of Employees" statute requires,
absent reasonable expectation of criminal misconduct or other improper behav-
ior, specific notification be provided to employees subject to monitoring,
informing them of the type, or types, of monitoring to which they may be sub-
9' NEV. REV. STAT. 200.620 (2003).
95 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
96 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996).
97 Id. at 1236-37.
98 Id. at 1236.
99 Id. at 1237 (continued use absent reasonable expectation privacy implies consent to
employer retrieval and viewing).
100 Id.
101 MD. CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402 (2003).
102 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
103 Elise M. Bloom et al, Competing Interests in the Post 9-11 Workplace: The New Line
Between Privacy and Safety, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 897, 914 (2003).
104 See generally, Douglas B. Topolski, Employee Privacy Rights in the Electronic Work-
place, 35-FEB MD. B.J. 40, 42 (2002) (citing Ferman v. Sheppard, 130 Md. App. 67, 73
(1998), reverting to the reasonable expectation of privacy test, and asserting that, regardless
of apparent protection by statute and common law, careful employers can reduce or elimi-
nate the E-mail privacy rights of their employees).
105 Bloom, supra note 103, at 914.
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ject.10 6 Use of employer-provided facilities after notification may indicate con-
sent to monitoring or interception. Nonetheless, the affirmative notification by
the employer alerts the employee to the monitoring or interception activity.
While this notification provision does not specifically affect access to
stored messages, it does at least constitute a level of privacy protection for the
employee by eliminating clandestine monitoring. By extension, absent notifi-
cation, the employee has a raised standard of expectation, justifying a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy,
d. Delaware
Delaware's "Notice of Monitoring of Telephone Transmissions, Electronic
Mail and Internet Usage" statute goes beyond the Connecticut statute,
10 7
requiring that notice of monitoring either be provided on a daily basis, or in
writing and acknowledged by the employee.1 °8 Further, employers violating
this requirement "shall be subject to a civil penalty," 10' 9 unlike the Connecticut
statute where a fine may be levied. °
e. Massachusetts
Massachusetts takes a far more general approach, providing that "[a] per-
son shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference
with his privacy. The superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity to enforce
such right in connection therewith to award damages."" '1 This parallels the
protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures" provided in the Fourth
Amendment.
The Massachusetts statute refers specifically to oral and wire communica-
tions, not electronic." 2 However, while federal statutes define wire communi-
cations as "aural transfer," i.e. transmission of sound,' 1 3 the Massachusetts
definition is broader, including "any communication made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid
of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the
point of reception." '114 Whether this definition includes electronic communica-
tions is not clear, especially with the advent of wireless networking.
f State Law Recap
While many states have enacted statutes addressing privacy of communi-
cations, such statutes provide minimal additional protection above and beyond
the federal code. State statutes either parallel the Wiretap Act, providing no
protection for stored communications, or omit mention of electronic communi-
cations altogether. Even statutes such as those enacted in Connecticut and Del-
106 C.G.S.A. § 31-48d(b)(1)-(2) (2003).
107 DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (2003).
108 DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(b).
109 DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 19, 705(c) (emphasis added).
110 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d(c) (2003) (emphasis added).
11 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214 § 1B (2003).
112 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 99.
113 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2000).
114 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 99(B)(1).
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aware, requiring employer notification of monitoring to be performed, exclude
access of stored communication records, i.e., mail already sent and received.
3. State Constitutions
While many states have constitutional protections paralleling those of the
Fourth Amendment, these provisions generally only apply to actions committed
by state actors." 5 California has extended these constitutional protections to
include the behavior of private employers,1 16 but cases alleging violations of E-
mail privacy in California have been dismissed due to the absence of a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy. 11 7 New Jersey has recognized a state constitutional
right of privacy and the Alaska Supreme Court articulated a basis for a "public
policy supporting privacy,"118 potentially foreshadowing a trend toward "state
constitutional privacy protections for private sector employees," 11 9 but such
changes come slowly, when they come at all.
4. Common Law
Plaintiffs have asserted claims under the common law "right of privacy" to
circumvent the limitations of the ECPA and state equivalents. 120 However, to
assert invasion of privacy by "intrusion into seclusion," plaintiffs must meet a
three-part test, demonstrating (1) an intrusion, which (2) is "highly offensive,"
and that (3) "the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy." 12' The
second prong has proven to be the difficult hurdle, particularly as electronic
monitoring typically involves no physical invasion.
122
'
123
The Alabama Supreme Court declined to hold an invasion "offensive or
objectionable" where the employer demonstrated a business need for the moni-
toring.' 24 California courts have held likewise, denying tort claims of invasion
115 Lee, supra note 2, at 149-50; Gantt, supra note 2, at 389-90; SAFON, supra note 41, at
101-02; Jarrod J. White, E-Mail@Work.com: Employer Monitoring of Employee E-Mail, 48
ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1188 (1997).
116 Gantt, supra note 2, at 389.
117 See infra discussion of Shoars v. Epson America, Inc; Flanagan v. Epson America, Inc;
and Bourke v. Nissan Motor Co. in Part III. B. 1.
118 Lee, supra note 2, at 150.
119 Id.
120 Kesan, supra note 3, at 302-04; White, supra note 115, at 1094-98.
121 Id. citing Kevin J. Conlon, Privacy in the Workplace, 72 CHI-KENT L. REv. 285, 290
(1996).
122 Id.; Lee, supra note 2, at 162-63.
123 Alternatively, a four-prong test is often referenced, where plaintiff is required to show a.
intentional intrusion, b. upon a private activity, which is c. "highly offensive to a reasonable
person," and that d. such intrusion violated a reasonable expectation of privacy. Such test is
equally difficult to meet. Adams, supra note 3, at 41-42.
124 White, supra note 103, at 1096 (analyzing the holding in Nipper v. Variety Wholesalers,
Inc., 638 So. 2d 778 (Ala. 1994)).
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of privacy,1 25 and directing issues of E-mail privacy to the jurisdiction of the
legislature. 
126
5. International Law
The United States is not alone in facing this issue; other industrialized
countries are facing the same tensions and uncertainties.
The U.K. provid s prtection much like that of Title I nf thi- ECPA qnlely
covering interception, and leaving access unprotected. However, within the
British interception statute, consent to publication requires acquiescence from
all parties, including non-employees,127 providing a higher level of protection
in one aspect, while totally excluding instances of data retrieval.
France goes further in their notification requirement, obligating employers
to notify labor representatives of any monitoring in the workplace. Data that
could identify an individual may only be collected subsequent to a filing with
the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertes, an agency created
by France's Law on Data Processing and Liberty.' 28 Furthermore France, the
source of the droit morale, stresses in its Civil Code that individual privacy
"trumps" an employer's economic concerns.'
29
Moving "up the protection ladder," Germany goes yet one step further,
eliminating distinctions between interception and access, and only allowing
interference with the rights of personal privacy when permitted by legislation,
collective bargaining agreement, or authorization from the company works
council. Monitoring is prohibited absent employee consent, unless either a
compelling interest or the prevention of a crime is involved.' 3 °
At the top rung is Italy, where worker dignity trumps property rights.'3 1
Statutes bar monitoring of particular individuals, and even general monitoring
for safety or productivity requires the approval of work councils. 132 As an
employer's property rights are secondary, retrieval of private files (potentially
including E-mail) from an employer's computer system is prohibited. 133
Outside of the United States, employee rights and dignity receive greater
emphasis. These concerns for the interests of the employee typically emerge as
limitations on implied consent and notice requirements. Inconsistency predom-
inates. However, this Note discusses the situation in the United States, and
125 HR Advisor, July-Aug. 1995, at 15, 18 (1990 decision of California Superior Court, Los
Angeles County) (referring to Flanagan v. Epson America, Inc., No. BC007036 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1991)).
126 HR Advisor, July-Aug. 1995, at 15, 18 (1990 decision of California Superior Court, Los
Angeles County) (referring to Shoars v. Epson America, Inc., No. B073243 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991), review denied, No. S040065, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 3670 (Cal. 1994)).
127 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), 2000, c.23 (Eng.).
128 Kesan, supra note 3, at 308.
129 Id. at 308-09.
130 Id. at 309-10.
131 Id. at 310 (citing GINO GIUGNI, Lo STATUTO DEI LAVARATORI [COMMENTARIO OF THE
LABOR STATUTE], Giuffre', Milano (1979)).
132 Id. at 310 (citing Lawrence E. Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity?: Electronic Monitoring in
the Workplace, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 379, 394 (2000)).
133 Id. at 310.
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international law provides merely perspective and guidelines to such
discussion.
B. Case Law
As there is a dearth of judicial precedent governing privacy of IM, history
must be derived by analogy from cases of intrusions into E-mail and other
electronic data. From the seminal cases in the early 1990's to today, decisions
generally focused on questions of reasonable expectation of privacy, intercep-
tion vs. access, and implied consent.
1. Seminal Cases
In the early 1990's, California courts decided three cases of E-mail intru-
sion (described below).134 The trade press in the computer industry showed
both pragmatism and outrage,135 foreshadowing the need to provide guidance
and direction in both the ethics and the mechanics of E-mail privacy, while
anticipating the antipathy towards doing so.136
Whether reading E-mail constitutes interception of electronic communica-
tions or retrieval of communications storage determines the choice of applica-
ble statute. Finding that interception requires capture of data in flight, courts
decided these cases on the communications storage statutes, statutes decidedly
more favorable to the employer.
137
a. Shoars v. Epson America, Inc. 138
In 1990, Epson America, Inc. fired Alana Shoars for protesting the corpo-
rate monitoring of employee E-mail messages. 139 Ms. Shoars took a very
moral-based stand. "Right is right, and wrong is wrong. There is no in-
between.""14 Shoars brought a wrongful termination suit under the common
law right to privacy, but the court dismissed it, finding that Shoars had no
reasonable expectation of privacy, and observing that any such expectation
must be established by the legislature.141
b. Flanagan v. Epson America, Inc. 142
Seven hundred workers at Epson filed a class action suit, alleging a viola-
tion of their right to privacy when their employer reviewed their E-mail absent
134 Gantt, supra note 2, at 398-401; Lee, supra note 2, at 142; White, supra note 115, at
1096-97.
135 Rifldn, supra note 36.
136 Id. ("[W]e have to be leaders in ethical issues..." but "[t]here is no evidence that the IS
community is willing ...to do that.") (quoting J. Jeffrey Smith, assistant professor at
Georgetown University, School of Business Administration.)
137 Gantt, supra note 2, at 399.
138 Shoars v. Epson America, Inc., No. B073243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No.
S040065, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 3670 (Cal. 1994).
139 Rifkin, supra note 36.
140 Id.
141 White, supra note 115, at 1096-97 (citing Shoars v. Epson America, Inc., No. B073243
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No. S040065, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 3670 (Cal. 1994)).
142 Flanagan v. Epson America, Inc., No. BC007036 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1991).
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employee consent.'4 3 A Los Angeles Supreme Court judge dismissed the suit,
ruling that there was no violation of privacy, and that companies are entitled to
manage and maintain their systems.' 44
c. Bourke v. Nissan Motor Co. 145
Employees terminated after their supervisor discovered that their E-mails
contained "inappropriate jokes and language" brought suit for invasion of pri-
vacy. 146 Like Shoars and Flanagan, this case failed for lack of a reasonable
expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, particularly as the employ-
ees had been informed that computer use should be limited to business
purposes. 14
7
2. Cases of Retrieval vs. Interception
Claims brought under Title I of the ECPA are more difficult to maintain
than those brought under Title 11,148 highlighting the importance of catego-
rizing the claimed infringing activity as either interception (subject to Title I),
or retrieval (subject to Title II). The contemporaneous access requirement
attributable to interception has proven key, 149 even in cases beyond the scope
of E-mail.' 50
a. Garrity v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.15 '
Defendant investigated plaintiffs E-mail folders subsequent to a com-
plaint by a co-worker of receiving sexually explicit E-mail from plaintiff s hus-
band. 1 52 Plaintiff asserted violation of the Massachusetts Wiretap Statute
153
prohibiting interception of specified types of communications. However, as the
messages had already been transmitted and stored prior to employer's access,
the court held that such access did not qualify as an interception, and denied the
claim. While applying state law, the court analogized to the ECPA for its anal-
ysis. 154 Further, the court opined in dicta that, even had the Wiretap Statute
applied, so would the "ordinary business exception," and the action would have
been lawful in any event.'
55
143 Jim Nash, E-mail Lawsuit Cranks Open Privacy Rights Can of Worms, COMPUT-
ERWORLD, Aug. 13, 1990, at 7.
4 Jim Nash & Marua J. Harrington, Who Can Open E-Mail?; Nissan Latest to be Sued for
Privacy Invasion, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 15, 1991, at 1.
145 No. B068705 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
146 Nash & Harrington, supra note 144.
147 White, supra note 115, at 1097.
148 See supra discussion in part III.A.l.a.
149 See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876-79 (9th Cir. 2002).
150 E.g. Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996) (involving the use
of a digital paging system provided by the City of Reno).
15' No. Civ.A.00-12143, RWZ, 2002 WL 974676 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002).
152 Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *1.
153 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 99(B) (2003).
154 Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *3.
115 Id. (citing Restuccia v. Burk Tech., Inc., 1996 WL 1329386, at *2-3 (Mass. Super.
1996).
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b. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. 1
56
Plaintiff claimed the defendant had unlawful accessed the plaintiffs
secure website in violation of, inter alia, the Wiretap Act157 and the Stored
Communications Act. 158 Although this case involved access to the plaintiffs
website, not E-mail, the court analogized to facts to those of prior E-mail
cases, 59 denying the wiretap claim because the data was not intercepted during
transmission, but was rather accessed from electronic storage, thereby making
Title I of the ECPA inapplicable.
16 1
Having held that Title I did not control, the court then turned to the Stored
Communications Act, Title II of the ECPA. 16 ' Defendant used a sign-on, a
user ID and password, obtained from a third party under false pretenses. 162 As
plaintiff had not provided the sign-on, the court did not find the access to be
authorized, leaving that issue to be resolved at trial.' 6 3
c. Steve Jackson Games Inc. v. United States Secret Service'
64
Unlike several other cases brought against the federal government, in this
case the plaintiff asserted no Fourth Amendment violations, claiming only vio-
lations of the Wiretap Act. 165 Referring both to definitions contained within
the statute and the legislative intent of the ECPA, the court held that "Congress
did not intend for 'intercept' to apply to electronic communications when those
communications are in electronic storage."' 166 Further, the court analyzed the
reasons that plaintiffs might prefer to bring claims under Title I rather than
Title II of the ECPA.
Stored wire communications are subject to different treatment than stored electronic
communications. Generally, a search warrant, rather than a court order, is required to
obtain access to the contents of a stored electronic communication. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(a) .... See James G. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance, § 4.10, at 4-
126-4-127 (1994) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99.647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 67-68
(1986)). 167
In other words, the standard of authorization has been lowered, at least
according to the Fifth Circuit.
d. Bohach v. City of Reno 168
Plaintiff police officers alleged violations of Title I of the ECPA and the
Fourth Amendment when the City of Reno investigated their message traffic on
156 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001), withdrawn andfiled 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
157 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
158 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000).
15' See Konop, 302 F.3d at 876-77.
160 Id. at 879.
161 Id. at 879-80.
162 Id. at 873.
163 Id. at 880.
164 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
165 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
166 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462.
167 Id. at 462, n. 7.
168 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996).
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the city's "Alphapage" text messaging system. 169 Holding that messages
retrieved from electronic storage are de facto not intercepted, the court ruled
that the city could not be liable for interception, and that any claims had to be
viewed under Title II rather than Title I of the ECPA.
170
3. Claims of Fourth Amendment Violations
The Fourth Amendment only protects against unreasonable searches or
seizure by government actors.1 71 While the U.S. Government as an employer
would be subject to suit under this protection, courts have held that a search of
electronic media is only unreasonable if reasonably unexpected, and so to assert
a claim of a violation of the Fourth Amendment for impinging on the privacy of
E-mail or other electronic data, a plaintiff must establish a "'subjective expec-
tation of privacy' which is objectively 'reasonable.' ,17 1
a. United States v. Maxwell
17 3
Plaintiff asserted that his employer, the U.S. Air Force, accessed his E-
mail in violation of his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable or
unwarranted searches. 17 4 The court did not deny that the plaintiff may have
had a reasonable expectation of privacy, violation of which might be actiona-
ble. 15 However, the court held that, once E-mail messages are sent to a grow-
ing number of recipients, privacy expectations diminish and soon disappear.
17 6
While this reasoning only provided the Air Force with access to those E-mails
which had been broadcast, the material found in those E-mails in turn provided
sufficient grounds for further search under a valid search warrant.' 77
b. United States v. Simons
178
Defendant Simons, employed by the Federal Bureau of Information Ser-
vices within the CIA, was charged with dealing in child pornography. Defen-
dant asked the court to exclude evidence found on his office computer,
asserting that searching his computer was a violation of his Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches. 179 The court held that, to assert pro-
tection under the Fourth Amendment, a claimant must first have an actual or
"subjective expectation of privacy [which] society recognizes as reasona-
ble."'180 As defendant was aware of the employer's official policy regarding
Internet use, including the potential of audit, defendant had no such expectation
of privacy. 81
169 Id. at 1233.
170 Id. at 1236.
171 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
172 U.S. v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
173 Id. at 406.
174 Id. at 415.
175 Id. at 417.
176 Id. at 418-19.
177 Id. at 419.
178 29 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D. Va. 1998).
179 Id. at 326.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 327.
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Additionally, the defendant claimed that his employer had violated Title I
of the ECPA, as the search had been performed without a search warrant.182
The court held that, as data was not being transmitted at the time of its access,
no interception had been committed, and therefore no warrant had been
required. 18
3
4. "Other" Cases
Several other cases establish or illustrate specific points of importance in
this discussion.
a. Smyth v. Pillsbury Company'
84
The plaintiffs employer terminated plaintiff for making inappropriate and
unprofessional comments in E-mail messages to his supervisor, including a
threat to "kill the backstabbing bastards" and a reference to a company party as
the "Jim Jones Koolaid affair." '185 The plaintiff sued for wrongful termination,
claiming the invasion of privacy "threaten[ed] clear mandate[ I of public pol-
icy,' 186 "an especially narrow" exception to the at-will employment policy.' 87
Although the employer had affirmatively assured employees that the privacy of
communications would be respected, the court nonetheless held the voluntary
transmittal of messages across a system commonly accessible to employees
deprived the sender of any expectation of privacy that sender might have
held.' 88 So, even where an employer provides promises of confidentiality, sub-
sequent events may negate the effect of such assurances.
b. Wesley College v. Pitts'
89
This case differs from the other cases discussed in that the employer
brought the claim for wrongful access by the employee, rather than the reverse.
Evidence indicated that the defendant had read E-mail which was displayed on
a user's screen despite not being its intended recipient. 90 The court ruled this
did not violate the ECPA, despite the plaintiff's attempt to classify the screen as
the interception device rather than simply a display vehicle.' 91 The court con-
cluded that such unintentional action could not constitute the affirmative action
required under the statute.1 92 Further, as the E-mail was accessed after it had
been transmitted (and received), no interception had occurred. 193 Interception
182 Id. at 329.
183 Id. at 329-30.
184 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
185 Id. at 98.
186 Id. at 99.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 101.
189 974 F. Supp. 375 (D. Del. 1997).
190 Id. at 381.
191 Id. at 384-87.
192 Id. at 382.
193 Id. at 386-87 (as communication was not captured "en route to its intended recipient"
interception did not occur).
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must occur before a message reaches electronic storage.194 This did not occur;
therefore, there was no interception.
1 95
c. McLaren v. Microsoft1
96
Microsoft confiscated plaintiffs office computer, and reviewed and dis-
seminated E-mail stored in a "personal folder," for which action the plaintiff
asserted an invasion of privacy. 9' The court held such a claim required dem-
onstrating either an invasion of plaintiffs physical domain, or behavior rising
to the level of spying. Neither was shown here. 19 8 The court noted that
Microsoft provided the computer on which the messages were stored, and so
the E-mails were not plaintiffs "personal property but ... an inherent part of
the office environment."' 99 Files on the plaintiffs computer were also stored
on the defendant's routing computer (i.e., the server); transmitted over a public
network, and at some point handled by at least one third party, and so no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy existed.2 °° Finally, even if the messages were
private, defendant had not committed what a reasonable person would consider
a "highly offensive invasion," and so the court ruled that no invasion of privacy
had occurred.20'
d. Deal v. Spears2 0
2
Title I of the ECPA provides exceptions and exemptions to the prohibition
on electronic interception and disclosure.20 3 Where the interception uses facili-
ties obtained from the provider of communication services, and occurs in the
"ordinary course of business," the "telephone extension" exemption applies .2 1
However, where the employer purchases the device from a third party (here,
Radio Shack) and installs that equipment itself, this exemption is not
applicable." 5
e. Schmerling v. Injured Workers' Insurance Fund2 ° 6
The Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act 207 closely
parallels Title I of the ECPA, even to the "telephone extension" exemption.
In Schmerling, the defendant purchased a third party recording device solely
194 Id. at 389.
195 Id. at 390.
196 No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015 (Tex. App. May 28, 1999).
197 Id. at *1.
198 Id. at *3.
199 Id. at *4.
200 Id.
201 Id. at *5.
202 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992).
203 18 U.S.C. § 2511(b); 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (by restrictive definitions, see note 204 infra).
204 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i) exempts interception where the intercepting device is "fur-
nished ... by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course
of its business" and the employer uses the device "in the ordinary course of its business."
205 Deal, 980 F.2d at 1158.
206 795 A.2d 715 (Md. App. 2001).
207 MD. CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-401 (2003).
208 Schmerling, 795 A.2d at 716.
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for intercepting conversations, which device added no functionality to the oper-
ation of the telephone system."° The court followed the reasoning of Deal21 °
and refused to recognize an exemption to the prohibition on message
interception.211
5. Summary
Generally, courts have found Title I of the ECPA inapplicable to E-mail
communications. Categorizing access as "retrieval" rather than "interception"
lowers the standard required by the courts of an employer to avoid being found
to have acted improperly. Similarly, courts have hesitated to find E-mail
"snooping" to be the sort of "highly offensive invasion" which would lead to a
finding of invasion of privacy. Only in those cases -where the technical details
permit a finding of interception do the courts appear willing to find the offend-
ing party culpable.
This may not be the case with Instant Messaging. Since there may be no
central message repository for Instant Messages, Title I may be more applicable
than Title II. Claimants may invoke specific statutory language rather than
trying to justify a reasonable expectation of privacy. This discussion is carried
forward in the next Part.
IV. ANALOGIZE AND DISTINGUISH
A. What IM Is, And What IM Is Not
Precedent and judicial interpretation of privacy of electronic communica-
tions almost exclusively involve E-mail, private websites, or telephone moni-
toring. Few cases have involved IM, which is not unexpected given the
newness of the technology. Categorizing IM within the statutory framework is
therefore problematic. While IM is different than E-mail, it is technically sub-
ject to the same sets of regulations.2" 2 However, Instant Messages are often
not retained in electronic storage, only residing temporarily on the network and
the recipient's screen."13 It is even likely that unstored Instant Messages may
not be discoverable, as cases refer to computer files, and a message that is
never stored is not a file.2" 4 While E-mail is frequently likened to "snail mail,"
IM is more akin to telephone conversation.
IM qualifies as electronic communication as does E-mail. However,
strong differences distinguish them. The requirement for data storage, or lack
of such requirement, is likely the major distinction for present purposes. It may
209 Id. at 726.
210 Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992).
21 Schmerling, 795 A.2d at 727.
212 The ECPA refers to "electronic" communications, and both IM and E-mail fall under
this umbrella.
213 Frank C. Morris, The Electronic Platform: E-Mail and Other Privacy Issues in the
Workplace, 20 NO. 8 CILW 1, 3 (2003).
214 See generally, Antioch, Co. v. ScrapBook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 651-53 (D.
Minn. 2002), on the analysis of electronic documents and files which may have been stored,
but subsequently deleted, finding that such files are still discoverable, but only if they can be
reconstructed. For messages never stored, reconstruction would not be available, and hence
discovery may be precluded.
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be inappropriate to apply the logic of Title II of the ECPA rather than Title 1.215
If a message is not stored, and is observed when sent, the access resembles a
wiretap more than a retrieval.
To further complicate matters, one must consider how message content is
revealed, i.e. whether visually observed at point of send (or receipt), or cap-
tured by appropriate software. If the former, courts must consider surrounding
circumstances to determine the reasonable expectation of privacy. 21 6 Where an
employee works in an open area, or reads messages aloud," privacy is not
reasonably expected. Where the data is captured by employer-selected
software, courts may look to cases where a conversation is captured on an
extension phone.218 Where use of an extension phone is not reasonable, or in
the IM scenario, where data capture is either surreptitious or unreasonable, the
eavesdropper may be liable.2 19
B. Analysis of IM Disclosure220
Due to the multiplicity of options, this analysis must be segmented and
approached on a heuristic, procedural, basis. First, one must determine how the
communicated message was disclosed to the employer. If disclosure was ena-
bled by electronic data capture, it is necessary to consider where the capture
functionality originated, whether within the IM software, the network or operat-
ing system, or with a third-party implementation. Then, if disclosure was via
electronic capture, it is essential to analyze (a) whether management notified
employees of the existence and installation of such a monitor, in conjunction
with (b) the employer's policies regarding message monitoring, and (c) adher-
ence to such policies.
1. The Observation Medium
Step one is to determine how the employer became aware of the subject
message or messages, and learned of the message content. The simplest case
involves one of the parties revealing the communication and its content to the
employer. Such action constitutes consent, and no invasion of privacy
215 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, respectively.
216 U.S. v. Carroll, 337 F. Supp. 1260 (D.C. 1971) (if conversation can be heard with unas-
sisted ear, no violation is found for recording using a tape recorder no more sensitive than
the human ear); Kemp v. Block, 607 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Nev. 1985) (no invasion of privacy
for recording conversation which was clearly audible, under circumstances which made such
audibility likely); U.S. v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1982) (listening to point-to-point radio
transmission was acceptable where such transmission was not undertaken with reasonable
expectation of privacy); U.S. v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15 (2nd Cir. 1988) ("recorded conver-
sation between defendants as they stood in public area of prison was not ... protected by
federal wiretap statute").
217 Kemp, 1264 F. Supp. at 1264.
218 Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 1992); Schmerling v. Injured Workers'
Ins. Fund, 795 A.2d 715 (Md.App. 2001).
219 Deal, 980 F.2d at 1157-58.
220 For the sake of clarity, the term disclosure is used here to include both interception and
access, regardless of presence or absence of storage medium.
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occurs.2 21 Incidental, inadvertent observation constitutes neither unlawful
monitoring, nor unauthorized access.2 22 Absent definitive overt action specifi-
cally taken to obtain information regarding message content, no claim against
an employer would stand.2 2 3 This would preclude any claim in which the mes-
sage is displayed on a public terminal or in a public area, unless steps had been
taken to avoid general availability.
Intentional message disclosure also removes any reasonable expectation of
privacy, as a party to the message has affirmatively authorized the dissemina-
tion of the message, so that the message is no longer private. 224 Rarely does a
recipient guarantee privacy and, even where this does occur, any breach would
be committed by the recipient, not the employer.22 5
Only where data is captured through specialized software, or specialized
options of the Instant Messaging software, must the analysis proceed to the
next step.
2. The Existence, and the Source, of Data Monitoring Software
To electronically monitor or intercept IM traffic, software is needed to
collect messages in transmission. IM products may include such functionality,
often implemented by setting a software option. Networks may have a data
capture feature, which is slightly less tied to the IM application, but still an
essential part of the overall operation of the system. Third-party software ven-
dors also market tools to collect screen displays and application data traffic.22 6
The source of the data capture software may determine availability of the
analog to the telephone extension exemption. Where recording equipment is
integral to the functioning of a communications system, courts have found the
interception not unlawful, and within the telephone extension exemption to the
Federal Wiretap Act, 2 2 7 but where it is a separate stand-alone facility, imple-
mented solely for data interception, courts have denied the exemption.228
221 Had the party revealing the message somehow committed to maintaining secrecy, this
would still hold, although the disclosing party might be liable for breach of another sort.
222 Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 384 (D. Del. 1997).
223 Id. Disclosure other than by data capture or sensory observation will not be considered.
This Note address concerns raised by IM, not those triggered by spy cameras or peepholes.
224 See generally, Snyder v. Lamb, Nos. B154091, B159265, 2003 WL 1194903 (Cal. App.
Mar. 17, 2003).
225 Note the only possible exception would be where the message is sent to a confidential
branch of the employer, for example a complaint sent to Human Resources, perhaps raising a
sensitive personnel issue. However, the issue addressed here is not whether the employer
can send the message to a specific individual, herein the one against whom a complaint is
lodged, but rather whether the employer can see it at all. A message sent to Human
Resources is viewable by the organization corporate, as that organization is the desired
recipient.
226 Leading products in this area include Laplink® from Traveling Software, Inc., pcAny-
where® from Symantec Corp., WideScope® from RazLee, Ltd., and CA-Replay® from
Computer Associates, Inc. The first two operate in the PC arena, WideScope in the
midrange server market, and CA-Replay for mainframe networks. Each permits either direct
monitoring of application screens, or capture of network traffic.
227 See supra note 204.
228 See Schmerling v. Injured Workers' Ins. Fund, 795 A.2d 715 (Md. App. 2002) (revers-
ing a lower court ruling to the contrary); see also James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591
F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir. 1979) (device installed by telephone company is presumptively
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While such prior cases involved telephone communications, the analogy is
strong here, as IM closely resembles telephone conversations.
Ergo, if monitoring is a function of the Instant Messaging software, or of
the operating environment, the exemption may apply, but where a separately
acquired (and installed) monitoring tool is used, courts would likely reject the
exemption.
3. Employee Notification
Most users of E-mail know that they may view a message multiple times,
and continue to view that message until they affirmatively delete it.2 29 This
general knowledge constitutes reasonable notice that messages are stored, and
while a user may not know where, she knows it is somewhere. This reasonable
notice does not extend to IM. As the average IM user likely expects that an
already-viewed message is gone from the system, i.e., cannot be retrieved, she
does not expect to find that message stored in a location accessible to a system
administrator. In such a case, a user may in fact have a reasonable expectation
of privacy for any message sent, or received, via IM.
Unless the employer has clearly informed all employees that a data cap-
ture facility is in place, and in use, employees may have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in Instant Messages. Lack of this reasonable expectation proved
the dispositive factor in many of the cases analyzed herein, but in IM, it appears
that the stronger defense may be a demonstration of informed consent, or at
least the implication of such consent.23°
Since constructive or indirect notice may be considered insufficient,
231
direct, confirmed, informed notification is clearly the goal.232 Such notice
resolves any question of privacy, and constitutes valid authorization for
employer access of captured data.
V. EMPLOYER PROCEDURES
As outlined above, privacy concerns arise only where message content has
been captured by installed software, and potentially only where such software
is not intrinsic to the Instant Messaging functionality or the system itself. If
employer requirements dictate that Instant Messages must be tracked, then
steps must be taken to avoid liability under the ECPA,2 33 or under torts such as
invasion of privacy.
"telephone equipment"); Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 1991) (device was
not considered "telephone equipment" as it was purchased elsewhere and connected to an
extension phone rather than directly to the telephone line).
229 Some E-mail systems automatically delete messages over a certain age, but that is not
important here.
230 Kesan, supra note 3, at 330-32.
231 Jandek v. Village of Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (police officer mak-
ing phone call was aware that telephone line was monitored and recorded, negating any
reasonable expectation of privacy).
232 Kesan, supra note 3, at 331-32.
233 . .. or the equivalent state statutes.
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A. Notification of Monitoring
Decisions in E-mail privacy cases often turn on the distinction between
interception and retrieval. As IM typically does not generate any such
database, disclosure is more likely to involve interception of messages, or at
least that may be the employee's expectation. Where data monitoring occurs,
the line gets even grayer between interception (by the monitor) and the subse-
quent retrieval to disclose the data. However, by providing employees with the
proper notification of the employer's ability, and intent, to monitor electronic
communications, an employer may avert any confusion.
If the employee has a rational and reasonable expectation that messages
can be, and at least periodically will be, monitored, and such monitoring does
subsequently occur, courts may reasonably hold that the employees, by contin-
ued use of the IM function, have implicitly authorized both the interception of,
and the access to, such messages.234 In these cases, employees would be pre-
cluded from asserting invasion of privacy or a violation of the ECPA. The
issue then becomes what constitutes reasonable notification, and what steps the
employer must take.23 5
B. The Downside of Notification
One may also want to remember that no good deed goes unpunished.
Electronic data is discoverable, only if such data has been retained and may be
retrieved, and court ordered production "trumps" any privacy considerations.236
Also, employers may be held liable for the actions, or the messages, of their
employees.237 However, if the employer has a policy of not monitoring IM
traffic, and consistently follows that pattern, then, absent notice of a problem
the employer cannot be held liable for offensive messages. This factor must be
considered, and employers must select which politically correct position pro-
vides the most benefit. On the one hand, the employer may elect to protect
employee privacy at the expense of allowing questionable employee behav-
ior;238 on the other hand, that same employer could reasonably decide to pro-tect employee sensitivities at the expense of employee privacy.239
C. Detecting and Eliminating Unwanted Software
A reasonable employer may provide network hardware and software, and
opt to exclude Instant Messaging functionality, perhaps even ban its use. In
234 See U.S. v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417-19 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
235 Kesan, supra note 3, at 330-31. There is also the question of grandfathered employees,
and whether they can be notified after a. they have been employed, and b. after systems have
been installed and put into use.
236 Star Publ'g v. Pima County Attorney's Office, 891 P.2d 899, 902 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that court ordered documents must be produced absent specific proof of harm and,
even should such harm be demonstrable, documents for which no harm has been shown must
still be forthcoming).
237 Kesan, supra note 3, at 317-21; ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.
MAIN HANDBOOK, Ch. 16, § III.B (2000).
238 No monitoring, which may improve employee morale but expose the employer to other
harm.
239 Monitoring, which, may protect the employer from other harm, but may offend
employees.
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such cases, what steps may that employer take towards (a) monitoring for unau-
thorized installation of software such as IM, (b) removal of such software, or
(c) monitoring of its use?
Monitoring may be accomplished by examining the files on the systems
used by the employees. Since the hardware is owned by the employer, moni-
toring is permissible, preferably after notification and a stated, enforced, pol-
icy.2 4 ° Should an employer find unwanted software to have been installed, the
,py, may ....... reques the .l..ye. to .--move an offend1ncy nnnln1tinn
or perform such removal itself. Alternatively, the employee might be given the
option of either removing the software or consenting to the employer's moni-
toring of message traffic. Provided that consent is informed, in writing, and
non-ambiguous, the consent requirement of the ECPA should be satisfied.
D. To IM Or Not To IM: That Is the Question
Before considering the question of IM monitoring, an employer should
carefully consider whether IM should be made available at all. While generally
less of a drain on corporate computer resources than traditional E-mail, IM may
trigger employee misuse and become a tool for sexual harassment, offensive or
other non-professional interpersonal communications, theft of corporate
secrets, and simple abuse of corporate time and resources.
Only if the benefits of IM outweigh these risks, need an employer adopt
IM and then consider whether message monitoring will be beneficial or detri-
mental. Monitoring allows auditing of employee activity; it may also expose
the employer to claims of abuse of privacy and increase employer liability for
discoverable behavior by employees.
Finally, should the employer conclude that IM, and monitoring of IM,
poses a net benefit, a clear and understandable company policy must be devel-
oped, communicated to all employees, acknowledged by all employees, and
enforced. Only in this way can the employer minimize the exposure to claims
under the ECPA, privacy torts, and statutes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Instant Messaging is the latest in a series of innovative tools arising with
the growth of the Intemet. While historically most E-mail privacy issues have
been decided based on "store-and-forward" technology, where messages are
retrieved from data storage rather than intercepted in transmission, this may not
apply to IM. With a normal IM operation, the message appears only on the
user's screen, and not retained elsewhere. Thus, while employers may be able
to apply the findings of the CONTU report, or may install software to record all
message activity, unless the user is so informed, statutes applying to data
retrieval will be inapplicable. 24" ' Rather, wiretapping statutes would determine
240 U.S. v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing U.S. v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103,
1108 (9th Cir. 2000) ("a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an item
in which he has no possessory or ownership interest.")).
241 Even if data capture software is implemented, so that message traffic is recorded and
later accessed, if employees are not aware of such software, they may be therefore relying on
a reasonable expectation. In such cases, courts are likely to look to the fact that data is
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the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy, and whether the employer's
business need could outweigh such expectation.
The analysis of such situations hinges on the "reasonable expectation of
privacy." Whether such an expectation exists in the IM environment is largely
a matter of the employer's stated and enforced policies,242 the physical logistics
of the officeplace,243 and the behavior of messaging partners. 24
Finally, in situations where an employer has not opted for Instant Messag-
ing software on its corporate network, the employer will always retain the right
to detect and delete any such unauthorized software, absent a contrary agree-
ment with its employees.
This Note has examined the history of the law regarding the privacy of E-
mail, and how such laws must be interpreted to deal with the technology of
Instant Messaging. Monitoring of Instant Messages likely will involve inter-
ception of communications rather than access of stored data, and may be
judged under the Wiretap Act rather than the Stored Communications Act.
This limits the exemptions available to the employer and raises the employee's
reasonable expectation of privacy. However, proper procedural steps by the
employer may protect against such liability, notifying employees of active poli-
cies regarding the monitoring of IM traffic, and thereby gaining at least implied
authorization to access any data so captured.
actually intercepted during transmission, and subsequently stored, making the Wiretap Act
applicable with its higher hurdles for exceptions.
242 A policy which is stated but never enforced may be more injurious than no policy at all.
If employees are aware that the policy is largely ignored, implied authorization may be moot.
However, in civil or criminal actions, message traffic which is subject to discovery may be
ordered, and failure to produce may constitute contempt.
243 Messages sent to users at publicly viewable workstations may have no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. If any casual observer has access to messages, such messages are public
and have no assertable protection.
244 One must consider the effects of "whistle-blowing" by the recipient, as a message recipi-
ent is constrained by neither any expectation of privacy on the part of the sender nor any
limits on functions which may be performed on received messages, e.g., printing, forward-
ing, copying, etc.
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